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Professor Sunder’s intriguing paper demonstrates the continuing power of 
the related ideas of environmentalism and the public domain, but it also 
identifies some of the hazards of those metaphors. I have only two unrelated 
thoughts to add to her analysis. 
First, I was struck by the parallels between her argument and the 
historiography involving the displacement by British colonists of Native 
Americans. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the “Indians” of North 
America were commonly depicted as noble savages, living on but not altering 
their natural environment. This imagery underlay the most common moral 
justification for their displacement by Europeans: they weren’t productive. In 
the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “[t]o leave them in possession of their 
country, was to leave the country a wilderness.”1 
Until recently, the main line of criticism of this vision and associated moral 
argument combined two related themes: first, it devalued the Indians’ 
nonacquisitive, natural, respectful way of living lightly upon the land while 
conserving it; and second, it fostered imperialism and unjust conquest. In his 
pioneering book, Changes in the Land, William Cronon introduced an entirely 
different line of criticism.2 The problem with the traditional account, he argued, 
is not merely that it prioritized aggressive, transformative uses of the land over 
conservation and harmony, but that it got the facts wrong. New England in 
particular, when the British arrived, was not a primeval wilderness, “a climax 
forest in permanent stasis,” respected and preserved by its sparse human 
inhabitants. It was instead cultivated and occupied, an enormous garden or 
pasture. Of the many ways that it had been modified by the Indians to suit their 
own ends, one of the most important was the removal of the underbrush. Early 
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British colonists remarked that one could ride a horse at a gallop through the 
forests. As anyone who has strayed recently from a hiking trail in New England 
can attest, the forest in its natural state is far denser. The openness of the 
seventeenth century had been deliberately produced by the Indians, specifically 
by periodically burning out the brush, to allow deer and other game to graze 
more effectively, and to enable the Indians more effectively to hunt them.3 
Acceptance of Cronon’s revisionist narrative requires reconsideration of our 
conception of the injustice of the conquest and ouster of the Native Americans. 
It was not the displacement of passive conservationists, by active, productive, 
rapacious people. It was the displacement of a civilization that rested upon one 
form of productivity and cultivation by a civilization that rested upon another 
form. 
Professor Sunder’s criticism of the traditional conception of traditional 
knowledge takes the same form and deserves to be similarly influential. The 
kinds of knowledge we describe, dangerously, as “traditional”—she 
demonstrates—are no more passive, raw, stable, or unproductive than the 
manner in which the Indians interacted with their physical environment. In 
crafting legal regimes that will handle knowledge like this with fairness, we need 
to recognize and accommodate its dynamic, active character. 
Second, reading Professor Sunder’s paper has reinforced my sense that we 
should be seeking, as a solution to this problem, not a harmonized global 
intellectual-property regime, in which creators of “traditional knowledge” 
obtain rights whose contours are determined by national laws, the content of 
which are largely dictated by multilateral treaties, but a more complex and 
variegated system of norms. Suppose that we added the following three parallel 
provisions to the TRIPS Agreement: 
(a) It shall be a defense to a claim of patent infringement that the 
inventor(s), in developing the protected product or process, relied 
substantially upon materials or knowledge taken from a member 
country in violation of that country’s laws.4 
(b) It shall be a defense to a claim of trademark infringement that the 
trademark holder, or the original developer of the mark, relied 
substantially upon materials or knowledge taken from a member 
country in violation of that country’s laws. 
(c) It shall be a defense to a claim of copyright infringement that the 
work in which copyright is claimed constitutes a reproduction of a 
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The effect of this reform would be to increase the leverage of countries in 
determining the terms on which flora, fauna, medicinal knowledge, folklore, 
and traditional art forms are exploited by others. Many countries already have 
“natural resources” and folklore-protection laws that deal with such matters, 
but those laws rarely figure significantly in the debate about traditional 
knowledge (broadly construed) because it is so easy to violate them with 
impunity. Adding the three provisions set forth above to the TRIPS Agreement 
would give the local laws teeth, not by penalizing violations directly, but by 
exposing violators to the economically devastating sanction of the forfeiture of 
their own intellectual-property rights. 
The countries in which traditional knowledge is currently concentrated 
could be expected to exercise their enhanced powers in various ways. Some 
would likely demand greater compensation from individuals and firms using 
their materials. Others would insist upon attribution. Still others would insist 
that the production of goods (drugs, clothing, et cetera) based upon traditional 
knowledge be done in the country where that knowledge originated. Finally, 
some would forbid the use of traditional knowledge altogether. Some of these 
responses likely would prove more effective than others, and we would then 
witness additional rounds of legal reform. 
To be sure, implementation of this proposal would not be simple. Securing 
the necessary modifications of the TRIPS Agreement would be very difficult. 
Once that hurdle had been surmounted, and the laws of the member countries 
of the WTO had been modified accordingly, we would expect to see 
considerable litigation over what constituted “substantial reliance” within the 
meaning of any of the three provisions. A fair amount of time and money would 
be spent sorting things out. 
Nor would the proposal solve all problems associated with traditional 
knowledge. In particular, it would do nothing to ensure that indigenous groups 
within developing countries got their fair share of the increased revenue that 
flowed to (or through) their national governments. But addressing that serious 
concern cannot be achieved through reforms engineered on the international 
level. Debate and struggle within each country are necessary if each group is to 
get its due. 
In sum, the proposal is neither perfect nor comprehensive. But it seems 
more promising that any of the alternative approaches to traditional knowledge 
currently on the table. 
